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"MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL
GROUP": WHY UNITED STATES COURTS
SHOULD ADOPT THE DISJUNCTIVE
APPROACH OF THE UNITED NATIONS
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
HANNAH MCCUISTONt
INTRODUCTION
The function of international refugee law is to consolidate
states' approaches to non-refoulement, the principle that no
refugee should be forced to return to a country in which the
refugee will be subjected to persecution.' When states deviate
from international refugee law, refugees' liberties can become
vulnerable to infringement. This is the landscape of immigration
law in the United States today. Congress enacted the Refugee
Act of 1980 ("Refugee Act") to incorporate the United States' legal
obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees ("Convention")-an instrument of international law to
which the United States is bound 2-into domestic law.' In doing
so, Congress adopted the Convention's definition of refugee: any
individual who is forced to flee his or her country of nationality
due to a "well-founded fear of being persecuted" based on "race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
t Notes & Comments Editor, St. John's Law Review, J.D., 2014, St. John's
University School of Law, Politics, 2011, New York University. I am grateful to my
family and friends for their encouragement and support in writing this Note.
1 GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 201 (3d ed.
2007). Non-refoulement is a relatively recent concept; it did not begin to surface in
international conventions until after World War I. Id. at 202 (citing Convention
Relating to the International Status of Refugees art. 3, Oct. 28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S.
3663).
2 DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:5 (Thomson
Reuters/West 2013) (1989), available at Westlaw LOAUS; see Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 178 (1993) ("[Tjhe history of the 1980 Act... disclose[s]
a general intent to conform our law to Article 33 of the Convention .. .
3 See H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 17-18.
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political opinion."4 A split of authority among the circuit courts
regarding who qualifies as a member of a "particular social
group" has led to the adoption of a rigorous standard, to varying
degrees, for refugee status determination that deviates from
international law and strips away some of the protections it
affords.5
To remedy this split of authority, courts should adopt the
approach of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees ("UNHCR"), the leading authoritative source on
international refugee law and the agency tasked with
supervising application of, and compliance with, the Convention.
The United States is not a party to the Convention. It is,
however, a party to the Convention's 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees ("Protocol"),7 which commits the United
States "to apply articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Convention to
refugees."' By virtue of the Protocol, the United States is legally
obligated to cooperate with the UNHCR.9 For this reason, U.S.
courts should adopt the UNHCR's approach to defining
"membership of a particular social group," as enumerated in its
Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a
Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of
the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the
4 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1A(2), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Convention]; see Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees art. I(1)-(2), done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223 [hereinafter Protocol].
' See infra Part II.
6 See Convention, supra note 4, pmbl., para. 6; Protocol, supra note 4, art. II.
' The Convention's definition of "refugee" included only those individuals who
suffered from persecution "[als a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951."
Convention, supra note 4; Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1(2). The 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees amended the Convention by eliminating the
quoted language. Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1(2).
' Protocol, supra note 4, art. I(1); see Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the
Secretary-General, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION ch. V.5, http://treaties.un.org/
PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=V-5&chapter=5&lang=en (last
visited Jan. 14, 2015); see also id. at ch. V.2 (current parties to the Convention);
Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist
Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1067 (2011) (stating that
although the United States is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention, when the
United States acceded to the Protocol, it bound itself to all the "substantive
provisions of the Convention").
9 See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 8;
see also U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees: Introductory Note by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees 4 (Dec. 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.pdf.
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Status of Refugees ("Guidelines on International Protection" or
"Guidelines").10  The majority of U.S. circuit courts have
neglected to do so, however, resulting in the creation of a
restrictive criteria that requires applicants to exhibit three
characteristics: "immutability," "social visibility," and
"particularity."1 For the United States to fully comply with its
international and domestic obligations, circuit courts must
instead adopt the Guidelines' disjunctive approach to defining
membership of a particular social group.
This Note calls for the adoption of the Guidelines on
International Protection of the UNHCR in defining "membership
in a particular social group" under the Refugee Act of 1980. Part
I discusses the United States' obligations under the Convention
and Protocol, and the process by which these obligations were
incorporated into domestic law with the enactment of the
Refugee Act of 1980. Part I also demonstrates how deviation
from the United States' international obligations led to the
circuit split. Part II outlines the views adopted by circuits on
both sides of the split. Part III asserts that circuit courts should
adopt the Guidelines on International Protection, and
demonstrates what adherence to these Guidlines looks like in
practice. Lastly, Part IV provides a more focused demonstration
of the difficulties associated with requiring social visibility and
particularity.
I. BACKGROUND
Article 1 of the Convention, 2 as amended by the Protocol,
defines a "refugee" as any individual who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
10 See generally U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International
Protection: "Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article
1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, IT 10-23, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter
Guidelines], available at http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html.
" See infra Part 11.2.
12 The Convention was born after World War II and in the context of the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Farbenblum, supra
note 8, at 1066-67.
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having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
13
The United States acceded to the non-self-executing 14
Protocol in 1968.15 To convert the Protocol into domestically
enforceable federal law, Congress enacted implementing
legislation, the Refugee Act of 1980, which incorporates the
Protocol's definition of refugee into U.S. immigration law
"without substantive alteration." 6
The Refugee Act does not define particular social group
17
because Congress "was not engaged in threshing out and
explaining a new idea, but in the importation into U.S. law of an
established idea-the refugee definition of the Convention and
Protocol,"18 to fill a gap in protection.' 9
13 Convention, supra note 4; see Protocol, supra note 4.
14 A non-self-executing treaty is not domestically binding until Congress enacts
implementing legislation that incorporates the treaty into domestic law. Medellin v.
Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008). A self-executing treaty is domestically binding upon
the United States' accession to the treaty. See id. at 504-05.
15 United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
Protocol is a non-self-executing treaty), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 112, 100 Stat.
3359, as recognized in United States v. Gonzalez-Torres, 309 F.3d 594 (9th Cir.
2002).
16 See T. David Parish, Note, Membership in a Particular Social Group Under
the Refugee Act of 1980: Social Identity and the Legal Concept of the Refugee, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 923, 924-25 (1992). The term refugee means:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2014).
17 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
18 Parish, supra note 16, at 925; see H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 17-18 (1979)
(stating that the Refugee Act brings U.S. domestic law into conformity with the
nation's international obligations); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 19 (1980) (Conf.
Rep.) (stating that the Senate's bill and the House's amendment incorporated the
U.N.'s definition of refugee, as enumerated in the Protocol); CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 96TH CONG., REVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT
PROGRAMS AND POLICIES 37 (Comm. Print 1980) ("[Tlhe Refugee Act proposed a
definition of the term 'refugee,' designed to bring the United States into accord with
our treaty obligations under the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees.").
19 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 18. Prior to the Refugee Act, U.S.
immigration law lacked a definition of refugee; subsection 42 was entirely
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The Refugee Act converts the Protocol into domestically
enforceable federal law.2" Therefore, to properly apply
membership in a particular social group pursuant to the Refugee
Act, U.S. courts must focus their efforts on interpreting what the
nation's obligations are under the Protocol. 2 '
A. Interpreting the United States' Obligations Under the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 1967
Protocol
The text and negotiating history of the Convention and
Protocol provide minimal guidance in construing the meaning of
membership of a particular social group. During the
Convention's drafting at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, the
Swedish delegate recommended including this basis of
persecution simply on the ground that social groups existed, and
individuals were often persecuted by virtue of their membership
in those groups.22 There was little debate concerning this
addition, which suggests that the delegates had a common
understanding of what membership of a particular social group
entailed at that point in history: quite possibly individuals
fleeing persecution by socialist governments, in particular
"landowners, capitalist class members, independent business
people, the middle class and their families."23 Regardless, any
definition of the term would include the factor of shared
interests, values, or backgrounds.24
Because the drafters did not define membership of a
particular social group, one must look beyond the four corners of
the Convention and Protocol to decipher the phrase's meaning.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ("VCLT") provides
nonexistent. See id. Refugee status was limited to individuals fleeing communism.
See id.
20 See H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 17-18.
21 U.S. refugee law has its origins in treaty law. In light of this, "the Supreme
Court, other federal courts, and the BIA have all recognized that it may be
appropriate to consider international law when adjudicating requests for asylum
and withholding of removal." U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM
OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 4 (2005)
[hereinafter BASIC TRAINING], available at http://www.uscis.govfUSCIS/
Humanitarian/Refugees%20&%2OAsylumAsylumIAOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/Inte
rnational-Human-Rights-Law-3 lauglO.pdf.
22 GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 1, at 74.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 75.
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possible methods of doing so.25 Article 32 of the VCLT states that
"ambiguous or obscure" treaty provisions may be clarified by
resorting to supplemental materials2 6  such as travaux
preparatoires, or preparatory works .2  The Convention and
Protocol's travaux preparatoires, however, shed little light on the
meaning of "social group." As was previously discussed, the
delegate responsible for suggesting the addition of this basis of
persecution provided a curt, somewhat circular, explanation to
his fellow diplomats: "[E]xperience had shown that certain
refugees had been persecuted because they belonged to particular
social groups."28 Other articles of the VCLT provide instruction
on additional ways of construing ambiguous provisions.
Pursuant to Article 31 of the VCLT, treaties must be
interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose."2 9 The Convention's
Preamble states that the purpose of the treaty is to "consolidate"
the existing international agreements related to the status of
refugees, and to "extend the scope of and protection accorded by
such instruments ."3  Furthermore, the Convention's drafting
took place simultaneously with the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") in 1948.1 The UDHR
extended the scope of "political, social, economic and cultural
rights," providing a "new and firmer basis for the development of
25 Although the Senate has not ratified the VCLT, it is viewed as an
authoritative source. Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in
U.S. Treaty Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 431, 435 (2004).
26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, done May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
27 Id. Travaux preparatoires are "preparatory work[s]," like the "negotiating and
drafting history... and the postratification understanding of the contracting
parties" to a treaty. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996).
28 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons, July 2-25, 1951, Summary Record of the Third Meeting, at 14, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.2/SR.3 (Nov. 19, 1951).
29 Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 3 1(1). The preamble of a convention is
a telling source for determining a treaty's "object and purpose." Farbenblum, supra
note 8, at 1074.
30 Convention, supra note 4, pmbl, para. 3.
"' See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
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the rights of refugees."32 In light of the above, the Convention
was drafted for the purpose of broadening the scope and
enhancing the flexibility of protections already in place.
Beyond the text of the Convention and Protocol, and the
Vienna Convention's methods of treaty interpretation, there is an
alternative source that provides the most enlightening guidance
in defining membership of a particular social group: the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the leading
international authority on refugee law.33
The UNHCR, a subsidiary organ created by the General
Assembly of the United Nations, is responsible for the
"international protection" of refugees and is tasked with
"[p]romoting the conclusion and ratification of international
conventions for the protection of refugees, supervising their
application and proposing amendments thereto. 34
The United States, as well as states across the globe, have
requested the assistance of the UNHCR in developing
instruments of refugee law. For example, in Europe, the
UNHCR has contributed to treaties pertaining to social security
and visa requirements affecting refugees. 5 Furthermore, the
UNHCR was instrumental in the development of the 1959
European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees,36 the
1957 European Convention on Extradition,37 the 1990 Dublin
Convention,3" and is currently working with members of the
European Union to harmonize their immigration laws.3 9
32 CORINNE LEWIS, UNHCR AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW: FROM
TREATIES TO INNOVATION 21 (2012).
13 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
G.A. Res. 428 (V), Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/428(V) (Dec. 14, 1950). Unlike Security
Council resolutions, resolutions of the General Assembly are non-binding.
34 Id. Annex 1, 8(a). The United States is a member of the UNHCR's
Executive Committee, which is responsible for advising the UNHCR on
international protection, as well as approving the Agency's programs.
15 LEWIS, supra note 32, at 35.
36 Id. The European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees codifies a
right of travel amongst Western European countries for refugees without a visa. Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. The 1990 Dublin Convention addressed the issue of which states of the
European Economic Community, the "forerunner" of the European Union, would be
responsible for assessing asylum applications. Id.
39 Id. This is by no means an exhaustive list of ways in which the UNHCR has
influenced the creation of states' domestic legal instruments relating to refugees.
The UNHCR has played a significant role in the development of the 1969 OAU
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa as well. Id.
at 34.
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Not only is the UNHCR influential abroad, but the U.S.
government also frequently seeks out the assistance of the
UNHCR in developing policies affecting refugees and asylum-
seekers.4 °  For example, in 1994, during the Clinton
administration, the U.S. government followed the UNHCR's
recommendation to "reverse[] the policy of summary return of
Haitian asylum seekers."41  The U.S. government has consulted
with, and funded the UNHCR in establishing refugee screening
procedures, including that of the U.S.N.S Comfort, the
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, as well as the screening operation
applicable to "interdicted Cuban asylum seekers ."42 Additionally,
during the Bosnia-Herzegovina civil war, the UNHCR was
appointed "gatekeeper" of determining which Bosnians fleeing
Serbian persecution were eligible for resettlement in the United
States.43
Article 35 of the Convention commits contracting parties to
cooperate with the UNHCR in its endeavor to promote the
international protection of refugees.44 This agency has published
materials that explicitly define membership of a particular social
group. The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Handbook")
states that a particular social group "normally comprises persons
of similar background, habits or social status."4 5
40 Scott Busby, The Politics of Protection: Limits and Possibilities in the
Implementation of International Refugee Norms in the United States, 15 BERKELEY
J. INT'L L. 27, 27 (1997).
41 Id. at 30.
42 Id.
4 Bosnian Refugees: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations &
Human Rights of the H. Comm. on Int'l Relations, 104th Cong. 38 (1995); Daniel P.
Derechin, Note, Alan Freeman, Refugee Law and Bosnian Rape Camps: Our Role in
the Slaughter, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 811, 819-20 (1997).
4 Convention, supra note 4, art. 35(1) ("The Contracting States undertake to co-
operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ... in
the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising
the application of the provisions of this Convention."); see also LEWIS, supra note 32,
at 23.
45 U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, % 77, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1992)
[hereinafter Handbook], available at httpJ/www.unhcr.org3d58e13b4.html.
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The Handbook is an authoritative source in the United
States. For example, it guided the U.S. Supreme Court in its
interpretation of a provision of the Refugee Act in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,6 a case involving the interpretation of a "well-
founded fear of persecution."4  The Court articulated that "the
Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the
Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform" U.S. immigration
law with the Refugee Act.48 The Court justified its interpretation
of well-founded fear of persecution under the Refugee Act by
highlighting that it was consistent with that of the UNHCR, as
outlined in the Handbook.49 Additionally, the training manual
for the "Asylum Officer Basic Training Course" of the
Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Immigration and
Citizenship Services cites the Handbook as a source to refer to
when determining whether an individual is eligible for refugee
status pursuant to the Convention and Refugee Act.50
The Handbook's broad definition of particular social group-
individuals who are "of similar background, habits or social
status"5 -indicates that the UNHCR did not intend for this basis
of persecution to be applied in a restrictive manner.
In 2002, the High Commissioner published a more
comprehensive and focused set of instructions: the Guidelines on
International Protection: "Membership of a Particular Social
Group" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or Its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.52 The
Guidelines outline two alternative routes to refugee status on the
ground of "persecution" based on membership in a particular
social group.53 First, pursuant to the "protected characteristics
approach," a particular social group is comprised of members who
46 480 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1987).
41 Id. at 423.
4 Id. at 439 n.22 (emphasis added); see also id. at 438-39 ("In interpreting the
Protocol's definition of'refugee' we are further guided by the analysis set forth in the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status." (citation omitted)).
49 Id. at 439. The Refugee Act's provision pertaining to the requirement of a
well-founded fear of persecution "mirrors the provisions of the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which provided the motivation for the
enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980." Id. at 424.
50 BAsic TRAINING, supra note 21, at 4, 5.
"' Handbook, supra note 45.
52 See generally Guidelines, supra note 10.
53 Id. 4, 6-7.
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exhibit a common characteristic that is immutable or is so
"fundamental to human dignity" that members should not be
required to alter that characteristic to escape persecution.54
Second, under the alternative "social perception approach,"55
members need not exhibit an immutable or unalterable trait;
rather the purported group must be cognizable, or recognized by
society as a distinct group.56 Therefore, an individual who is a
member of a group comprised of individuals who share, for
example, the same profession, would be entitled to the
protections of the Convention and Protocol pursuant to the social
perception approach, even though that person could potentially
change professions to escape persecution, assuming all other
requirements have been met. The Guidelines also provide that
there is no additional requirement of cohesiveness; members of
the group need not associate with one another.5
After applying the VCLT, and in light of the UNHCR's
Handbook and Guidelines, the standard for determining whether
an applicant is a member in a particular social group is relatively
broad and flexible. As long as the purported group shares a
common, "immutable characteristic," or is cognizable by society,
it qualifies as a social group pursuant to the Convention and
Protocol. This broad approach, however, differs significantly
from the more restrictive standard that U.S. circuit courts
employ when determining whether an alien falls within the
category of membership in a particular social group.
B. United States' Interpretation of "Membership in a Particular
Social Group"
Immigration judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA"), and federal circuit court judges are the primary
interpretative bodies of U.S. immigration law. 8 The BIA is an
54 Id. 6 (internal quotation marks omitted) ("The first, the 'protected
characteristics' approach... examines whether a group is united by an immutable
characteristic or by a characteristic that is so fundamental to human dignity that a
person should not be compelled to forsake it.").
5, Id. 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
56 Id. ("The second approach examines whether or not a group shares a common
characteristic which makes them a cognizable group or sets them apart from society
at large.").
57 Id. 15.
Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUST., http:ll
www.justice.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last updated Nov. 2011).
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administrative body of the U.S. Department of Justice that has
jurisdiction over appeals arising from decisions of immigration
judges across the nation.59 The parties to these proceedings are
the U.S. government and an alien seeking a remedy under U.S.
immigration law."
1. "Particular Social Group" Under Acosta
In Acosta, a case of first impression, the BIA defined
membership in a particular social group.61 The BIA held that
members of a taxi cooperative in El Salvador who were targeted
by anti-government guerillas were not members of a particular
social group.62 Members of the cooperative were assaulted and
received threats of retaliation when they refused to comply with
the guerillas' demands.63
In grappling with the meaning of particular social group, the
BIA first referred to the other bases of persecution enumerated
in the Refugee Act-"political opinion," "nationality," "race," and
"religion"64
-immutable, fundamental characteristics that an
individual should not be required to alter to escape persecution.65
Pursuant to the canon of ejusdem generis,66 when general and
specific words are listed together, the general words should be
interpreted "in a manner consistent with the specific words."67
The BIA reasoned that in light of ejusdem generis, "persecution
on account of membership in a particular social group" must also
be triggered by an immutable characteristic that is shared by
members of the purported group.68 The BIA articulated that the
characteristic can be innate, like gender, or it can be a "shared
past experience such as former military leadership or land
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). Although Acosta was partly overruled
by a subequent BIA decision, its interpretation of membership in a particular social
group was left untouched. See Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 439 (overruling
Acosta's interpretation of the proper standard for establishing a well-founded fear of
persecution).
62 Acosta, 19 I & N. Dec. at 234. Taxi drivers were targeted to create
transportation stoppages in an attempt to weaken the country's economy. Id. at 216.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 233.
65 Id.
66 "[O]f the same kind." Id.
67 Id. (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946)).
68 Id.
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ownership."69 The BIA held that the occupation in question, taxi
driver, was not an unalterable characteristic.70  Therefore,
members of the taxi cooperative who refused to kowtow to the
guerillas did not constitute a particular social group under the
Refugee Act.71
Circuit courts nationwide adopted Acosta's immutability
standard, which is the same as the Guidelines' protected
characteristics approach.72 Some of the characteristics which
were held to be immutable include: sexual orientation;
73
Somalian females who are forced to undergo genital mutilation;
74
"the educated, landowning class of cattle farmers targeted by"
Columbian rebels;75 Christian women in Iran who opposed the
Islamic dress code for women; 71 "parents of Burmese student
dissidents";77 and Ugandan children who were formerly enslaved
by guerillas.78
2. The Emergence of "Social Visibility"
After Acosta, the BIA's application of membership in a
particular social group took on a new form. The following cases
track the BIA's evolving approach, which resulted in the addition
69 Id.
70 Id. at 234.
71 See id. at 236.
71 See Guidelines, supra note 10, 6.
73 Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that
homosexuality is an innate characteristic that an individual should not be forced to
suppress to evade persecution).
74 Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 798 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the
victim's gender, an immutable characteristic, was a "motivating factor" for the
persecutor).
75 Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2005). Applying
Acosta, the court stated that members of the wealthy, educated, landowning class of
cattle farmers comprise a particular social group because even if they were to alter
these characteristics, the guerillas would likely still target them. Id. at 672-73.
76 Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596, 604 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
applicant was a member of a particular social group, but she did not sufficiently
demonstrate that she was persecuted or had a well-founded fear of persecution
because of her membership in that group).
77 Lwin v. INS, 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998) ("When the Acosta formulation
is applied to the facts of this case, we conclude that parents of Burmese student
dissidents do share a 'common, immutable characteristic' sufficient to comprise a
particular social group.").
18 Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329
F.3d 157, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2003).
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of two new requirements-social visibility and particularity-to
the existing standard for refugee status determination under
Acosta.
a. In re R-A-
In In re R-A-,79 the BIA held that in Guatemala, women in
relationships with men who believed they were superior to
women did not constitute a particular social group because they
were not recognized by society as comprising a "societal
faction." ° This case demonstrates the BIA's earliest attempt to
incorporate a social visibility determination into the particular
social group analysis.8 ' The BIA articulated that "political
opinion," "nationality," "race," and "religion" are all
characteristics that distinguish recognizable factions in society. 2
Therefore, in order for a group to constitute a particular social
group under the Refugee Act, that group must be recognized as
distinct from society.8" The BIA's use of the term "recognize" laid
the groundwork for a more developed social visibility factor in In
re C-A-.
b. In re C-A-
In In re C-A-,84 the BIA declined to recognize informants
against a Columbian drug cartel as a particular social group.85
The applicant's claim was dismissed, in part, on the ground that
the purported group lacked social visibility, given the applicant's
conduct was performed "out of the public view."8
6
The BIA fell short of explicitly labeling social visibility as a
requirement. However, it did place unprecedented emphasis on
the need for visibility and recognizability. Pursuant to the
BIA's approach, social visibility hinges on whether society
7 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
80 Id. at 918.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See id.
84 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
85 Id. at 961.
8 Id. at 960-61.
87 Id. at 960.
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perceives the individual, based on an external characteristic, as
a member of the purported group, not on whether the group as a
whole is cognizable or perceived by society. 8
Furthermore, the BIA distinguished this case from In re
H-,89 an earlier decision in which it held that a subclan in
Somalia, the Marehan, constituted a particular social group.90 As
in C-A-, the BIA in H- considered the extent to which members of
the purported group would be recognizable to society.9 ' It
reasoned that the subclan was distinguishable from society based
on, among other things, linguistics.92 This reasoning indicates
that when the BIA discusses social visibility, it is not only
referring to the visibility of the individual within the purported
group, but also to a type of literal visibility based on
characteristics that are externally distinguishable, such as
behavior, physical attributes, and language.
c. In re A-M-E & J-G-U-
In In re A-M-E & J-G-U-,94 the BIA refused to recognize
"affluent Guatemalans" as a particular social group.95 The BIA
placed even greater emphasis on the importance of
recognizability. 96 This case was remanded to the BIA by the
Second Circuit with the request that it further explain the
meaning of particular social group and why the purported group,
affluent Guatemalans, did not qualify as one.97 On remand, the
BIA cited its decision, C-A-, as a reaffirmation of the importance
of the social visibility requirement in determining what
88 Id. at 956-57 ("[W~e have considered as a relevant factor the extent to which
members of a society perceive those with the characteristic in question as members
of a social group.").
89 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996).
90 Id. at 343 ("The record before us makes clear not only that the Marehan share
ties of kinship, but that they are identifiable as a group based upon linguistic
commonalities.").
91 See id. at 342-43.
92 Id. at 343.
93 See id. Language is "socially visible" because upon hearing an individual
speak, society has the potential to, based on a difference in language or accent, for
example, categorize that person as being part of a particular social group.
94 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007).
91 Id. at 77.
1 Id. at 74.
97 Id. at 69.
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constitutes a particular social group,9" and further articulated
"the attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable
and discrete."99
The BIA began its analysis by applying the Acosta
immutability standard,1 0 stating that although "wealth" is not
an immutable characteristic, individuals should not be expected
to divest themselves of wealth. 101 The BIA held that regardless of
the conclusion of its immutability analysis, the group failed to
meet the particular social group standard on other grounds." 2
Wealthy Guatemalans were not identifiable in society and
therefore lacked the requisite social visibility under the Refugee
Act.10 3 In addition, the group was too "amorphous" and could
potentially encompass a large fraction of society.10 4 Therefore,
the group did not demonstrate the requisite particularity to
constitute a particular social group.105
Throughout the majority of its opinion, the BIA focused on
whether the aliens themselves were readily identifiable by
society, based on an externally visible characteristic, as members
of the purported group." 6 This focus marked a departure from
the BIA's opinion in Acosta, which hinged instead on whether
individuals of the purported group shared an immutable
characteristic so fundamental to their identity that they cannot,
" See id. at 74.
9 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956 (B.I.A.
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
100 See id. at 73. InAcosta, the BIA stated:
"Persecution on account of membership in a particular social group" refers
to persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a
group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic,
[that is], a characteristic that either is beyond the power of the individual
members of the group to change or is so fundamental to their identities or
consciences that it ought not be required to be changed.
19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
101 A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73-74.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 69.
104 Id. at 76.
105 Id.
10I See id. at 74.
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or should not, be required to alter that trait in order to escape
persecution.107 The BIA solidified its characterization of social
visibility and particularity as requirements in In re S-E-G-.108
d. In re S-E-G-
In In re S-E-G-, the BIA refused to recognize a group of El
Salvadoran youths who evaded recruitment into the criminal
gang "Mara Salvatrucha," as members of a particular social
group. °9 With reference to A-M-E & J-G-U- and C-A-, the BIA
stated that in order for an applicant to demonstrate that he is a
member of a particular social group, he must exhibit social
visibility, to the extent that he is recognized by society as being
part of the purported group, and particularity. 0  The aliens
provided insufficient evidence that they were "perceived as a
group" by society at large, and failed to demonstrate the requisite
social visibility."'
R-A-, C-A-, A-M-E & J-G-U-, and S-E-G- gradually elevated
social visibility and particularity from mere factors to consider
when assessing an alien's asylum claim, to absolute
prerequisites." 2  This approach deviates from the BIA's
immutability standard in Acosta, which only requires the alien to
107 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
108 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008).
109 Id. at 582-88.
110 Id. 582, 587 ("[M]embership in a purported social group requires that the
group have particular and well-defined boundaries, and that it possess a recognized
level of social visibility.").
111 Id. at 583, 587.
112 Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 685 (8th Cir. 2012) (Bye, J., concurring).
First, in In re R-A-, the BIA's dismissal of the respondent's asylum claim was
premised on the finding that the respondent himself was not recognized as being
part of a faction in society. 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (B.I.A. 1999). Subsequently, in In
re C-A-, the BIA placed even greater emphasis on the need for recognizability and
social visibility. 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006). The BIA held that the
purported group did not constitute a particular social group because its members
lacked the requisite social visibility-that is, recognizability, given "the very nature
of the conduct at issue is such that it is generally out of the public view." Id. at 960.
In In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, the BIA reasoned that "the attributes of a particular
social group must be recognizable and discrete." 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007)
(emphasis added) (quoting C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Lastly, in In re S-E-G-, the BIA articulated that the common characteristic
must make the members easily identifiable in society. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 584.
2014] MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP 547
provide sufficient evidence of persecution on account of an
immutable characteristic, and is still treated as relevant and
authoritative by circuit courts today.113
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The BIA's addition of social visibility and particularity
requirements has led to a split of authority among federal circuit
courts. Courts are divided on whether these two characteristics
are in fact requirements that must be met when assessing an
application for refugee status. Both sides of the circuit split
apply a more rigorous standard than that of the Guidelines. The
minority of circuits does not view social visibility and
particularity as prerequisites. Instead, the minority applies
Acosta's immutability standard alone. The minority's approach
differs from that of the Guidelines, which provides, in addition to
the protected characteristic, or immutability approach, an
alternative route to refugee status via the social perception
approach. The majority of circuits, on the other hand, require
immutability, social visibility, and particularity.
A. Approach One: Immutability and Nothing More
The Third and Seventh Circuits have declined to follow the
BIA's lead in applying social visibility and particularity as
requirements of classification as a particular social group under
the Refugee Act.114 The courts' rejections stem primarily from
the difficulties they associate with applying an "'external'
criteri [on] [like 'social visibility'] to identify a social group."115
In Gatimi v. Holder"6 and Ramos v. Holder,"7 the Seventh
Circuit rejected social visibility as a requirement. 18  Gatimi
involved defectors of a Kenyan clan,1 9 and Ramos, a young man
who resisted recruitment into violent gangs in El Salvador.'2"
"I In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part by In re
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
114 Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 608-09 (3d Cir.
2011); Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009).
115 Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 430; see Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604.
116 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009).
117 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009).
118 See Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616; see also Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 428.
119 Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 614.
12 Benitez Ramos, 589 F.3d at 428.
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To illustrate the impracticalities of requiring social visibility,
the Seventh Circuit provides several examples. "[R]edheads," the
court in Ramos articulated, are externally distinguishable, but
they do not constitute a particular social group.121 Veterans,
however, do constitute a particular social group, yet their
attributes do not put society on notice that they are members of
that group.1 22 Furthermore, those who are, or could potentially
be persecuted, will try to remain invisible and conceal the
characteristic for which they will be targeted.1 23 For example, the
court in Gatimi noted that "homosexual[s] in a homophobic
society will pass as heterosexual[s]"124 if they suppress their
sexuality.
In Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General of the United
States,25 the Third Circuit gave an impassioned critique of the
BIA's approach to social visibility and particularity. 126
Valdiviezo-Galdamez fled from his country of origin, Honduras,
to escape Mara Salvatrucha, a criminal gang heavily involved in
drug trafficking.127  As a consequence of Valdiviezo-Galdamez's
refusal to join the gang's ranks, he was subjected to severe
physical abuse and death threats.1 2' The BIA, however, rejected
the alien's application for asylum on the ground that he did not
exhibit the requisite social visibility and particularity. 29
On appeal, the Third Circuit asserted that the
inconsistencies of the BIA's application of social visibility13 ° and
particularity undermined the deference that the BIA would
otherwise be entitled to under the Supreme Court's Chevron
test.13 The court articulated that "[algencies [like the BIA] are
121 Id. at 430.
122 Id.
123 Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615.
124 Id.
125 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011).
126 Id. at 604.
127 Id. at 586-87.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 589. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the BIA's judgment. Id.
at 612.
130 For example, pursuant to Acosta's immutability standard, the BIA previously
held that homosexuals were members of a particular social group. Id. at 604. Under
the new standard that requires social visibility, however, a homosexual would be
precluded from refugee status because homosexuality can be concealed and kept out
of public view. Id. at 604-05.
131 Id. at 604. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., the Supreme Court stated that when a court reviews the interpretation of a
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not free, under Chevron, to generate erratic, irreconcilable
interpretations of their governing statutes. ' 132  What was
particularity worrisome to the Third Circuit was the fact that the
BIA added the social visibility and particularity requirements
haphazardly, without even providing a "principled reason" as to
why it did so. 133
The Third Circuit heavily critiqued the substance of the
requirements as well. Application of a criterion that hinges on
whether members exhibit "on-sight visibility" is an impractical
approach to determining whether an individual is a member of a
particular social group."' Citing the Seventh Circuit, the Third
Circuit asserted that members of persecuted groups conceal the
characteristic that triggers persecution."35 To deny these victims
asylum on the ground that they are not "socially visible," to put it
simply, just does not make sense. 36
statute by a federal government agency, like the BIA, it must first determine
whether Congress "has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984). If it has, then the agency's interpretation is not entitled to
deference. Id. at 842-44. However, if Congress has not spoken directly on the issue,
then the agency's interpretation is entitled to deference; the reviewing court does not
simply fill the void with its own interpretation of the statute. Id. at 843.
Furthermore, courts can only overturn a judgment of the BIA if that judgment
constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Melissa J. Hernandez Pimentel, Law
Summary, The Invisible Refugee: Examining the Board of Immigration Appeals'
"Social Visibility" Doctrine, 76 MO. L. REV. 575, 580 (2011).
132 Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 919 (9th Cir. 2009) (Berzon, J.,
dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
113 Id. at 608. In a number of early decisions, the BIA approved the asylum
applications of individuals who alleged persecution on account of their membership
in a particular social group even though the characteristics on which persecution
were based were entirely internal and could not be perceived by society. In re
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 366-67 (B.I.A. 1996) (approving the application of a
woman opposed to genital mutilation on the ground that she was persecuted on
account of her membership in a particular group); In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658,
662 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding that members of the El Salvadoran national police were
members of a particular social group under certain circumstances); In re Toboso-
Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding that homosexuals required to
register in Cuba were members of a particular social group); see also Valdiviezo-
Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604. However, beginning with R-A-, the BIA introduced social
visibility and particularity requirements that preclude individuals to which the BIA
had previously afforded refugee status from qualifying as members of a particular
social group. Id. at 596. Therefore, the addition of social visibility and particularity
represents a divergence from precedent.
134 See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 606-07.
135 Id. at 607.
36 See id.
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The Third Circuit asserted that particularity is just another
"articulation" of social visibility and the "government's attempt to
distinguish the two oscillates between confusion and
obfuscation.""13 In its brief, the government argued that a social
visibility determination ensures that the applicant is part of a
social group that is perceived by society as a distinct group of
persons. 138  The particularity requirement, on the other hand,
requires that the group be "definable."13 9 The court saw no
difference between these two concepts. 4 ° In sum, the Third and
Seventh Circuits reject social visibility and particularity as
requirements on the ground that they are impractical and
arbitrary; they can be taken into consideration pursuant to a
holistic analysis however.1
41
B. Approach Two: "Social Visibility" and "Particularity" as
Additional Requirements to Immutability
Outside of the Third and Seventh Circuits, circuit courts that
have addressed the issue have held that the BIA's application of
social visibility and particularity as requirements is entitled to
Chevron deference on the ground that they constitute valid
efforts to specify the meaning of particular social group pursuant
to the Refugee Act. 142
In Gaitan v. Holder,14 3 the Eighth Circuit held that an
applicant who fled his country of origin to escape retaliation after
refusing to join a criminal gang did not constitute membership in
a particular social group on the ground that he did not exhibit
the requisite social visibility and particularity. 144 The court
articulated that in S-E-G-, the BIA "refined its definition of a
'particular social group' by reasoning that an asylum-seeker
must exhibit both a level of social visibility that would allow
137 Id. at 608.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. ("'Particularity' appears to be little more than a reworked definition of
'social visibility' and the former suffers from the same infirmity as the latter.").
141 Id. at 608-09; Benitez Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009).
142 E.g., Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 680 (8th Cir. 2012).
1 671 F.3d 678.
'" Id. at 682.
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society to recognize that the asylum-seeker is part of the
purported social group, as well as particularity, which ensures
that the group is discrete and well-defined.
145
For the very same reasons outlined in Gaitan v. Holder, the
Eleventh Circuit in Velasquez-Otero v. United States Attorney
General146 held that a man who fled Honduras to escape
recruitment by a violent gang was not entitled to refugee status
under the Refugee Act. 4 v The First, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits have also denied aliens' petitions for review on the
ground that individuals fleeing Central America to escape gangs
are not members of a particular social group under the BIA's
framework. 4
8
In Gomez v. INS,149 the Second Circuit reviewed the BIA's
dismissal of a young El Salvadoran woman's application for
asylum, which was based on the claim that she belonged to a
particular social group comprised of women who have been
dehumanized by violent guerillas through brutal beatings and
rape.150 In assessing the viability of the woman's claim, the court
asserted that to qualify as a member of a particular social group,
individuals must share an immutable characteristic that "serves
to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor-or in the eyes of
... Id. at 680. The court adopted the BIA's approach because panels of judges in
earlier decisions did so. Id. at 681 ("As a result, this Court cannot find that the social
visibility and particularity requirements articulated in Matter of S-E-G are
arbitrary or capricious.").
146 456 F. App'x 822 (l1th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 524
(2012).
147 Id. at 824-26.
148 Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2012) (denying the
petition for review on the ground that the purported group was not "perceived as a
group" by society); Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2012) (petition for
review was denied on the ground that, in part, the purported group lacked a shared,
innate, "easily recognizable" characteristic); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d
641, 652-54 (10th Cir. 2012) (requiring social visibility but defining the phrase in a
less restrictive manner by stating that. social visibility "requires that the relevant
trait be potentially identifiable by members of the community, either because it is
evident or because the information defining the characteristic is publically
accessible."); Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 21, 26-27 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding
that the petitioner's claim failed on the ground that the purported group lacked
cognizability, cohesiveness, and social visibility); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d
855, 860-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying the petition for review on the ground that the
shared characteristic was not "recognizable and discrete" (quoting S-E-G-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 579, 586 (B.I.A. 2008)) (internal quotation mark omitted)), overruled in part by
Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2013).
149 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991).
150 Id. at 663-64.
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the outside world in general."'5 ' The court denied the woman's
petition for review on the ground that there was insufficient
evidence that she exhibited a characteristic, other than gender or
youth, that made her identifiable to persecutors as a member of
the purported group. 15 2
The Fifth Circuit joined the majority of its sister circuits in
adopting the BIA's approach to social visibility and particularity
in Orellana-Monson v. Holder.'15  The court stated that
incorporation of these two requirements into the existing
standard constituted "a subtle shift that evolved out of the BIA's
prior decisions.' 1 54 Furthermore, the court asserted that the BIA
is entitled to refine and make adjustments to the definition of
particular social group to accommodate for asylum-seekers'
claims. 1' 5
C. How the Guidelines Differ from the Circuit Courts'
Approaches
There are two major differences between the approach
outlined in the Guidelines, and that of the BIA and U.S. circuit
courts. First, the Guidelines call for the adoption of two
alternative approaches to refugee status, 156 whereas a majority of
circuit courts utilize one approach that requires the alien to
demonstrate three characteristics, immutability, social visibility,
and particularity-a far more demanding standard to satisfy.
Under the UNHCR's Guidelines, the asylum-seeker need
only prove that: (1) pursuant to the protected characteristics
approach, the purported group shares a characteristic that is
immutable or is "so fundamental to human dignity that a person
should not be compelled to forsake it"; 57 or that, (2) pursuant to
the social perception approach, the common characteristic makes
the purported group cognizable, setting it apart from the rest of
society. 58 Circuit courts, on the other hand, require members of
151 Id. at 664 (emphasis added) (citing Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571,
1576 (9th Cir. 1986)).
152 Id.
'5 Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d at 520.
15 Id. at 521.
155 Id.
116 Guidelines, supra note 10, 1fl 5-7, 10, 11.
157 Id. 6.
158 Id. 1$ 7, 11.
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the purported group to, at a minimum, share a common,
immutable characteristic, and in some circuits even exhibit social
visibility and particularity.
Second, although the social perception approach and the
social visibility requirement sound similar, they are two distinct
concepts. The Guidelines' social perception approach requires
the purported group as a whole to be cognizable by society, 1 9
whereas the social visibility approach of some circuits requires
the individual asylum-seeker within the group to possess an
externally distinguishable trait that sets the asylum-seeker apart
from society "in the eyes of a persecutor."160 According to Alice
Edwards, the Senior Legal Coordinator and Chief of the
Protection Policy and Legal Advice Section of the Division of
International Protection for the UNHCR, the Agency "has been
at pains to stress that the social perception approach is different
from social visibility and ... does not require that the group be
visible to the naked eye in a literal sense [or] that the common
attribute be one that is easily recognizable to the general
public." 6 '
III. THE UNHCR's APPROACH TO DEFINING "MEMBERSHIP OF A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP"
Methods of statutory interpretation under the VCLT, the
Convention's allocation of authority to the UNHCR, the extent to
which the United States has relied in the past on the UNHCR for
guidance in developing domestic refugee law, and the
impracticalities of applying an "external criterion," all
demonstrate that circuit courts should adopt the UNHCR
Guidelines' approach to defining membership of a particular
social group. Congress enacted the Refugee Act to convert the
Protocol-which legally binds the United States to the
159 Id.
160 Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) ("A particular social group is
comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common
which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor-or in the eyes of the
outside world in general." (citing Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th
Cir. 1986))).
161 U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Distinction, Discretion, Discrimination: The
New Frontiers of Gender-Related Claims to Asylum 6 (June 18-19, 2012),
http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=category&category=REFER
ENCE&publisher=&type=&coi=&docid=4ffd430c2&skip=0 (by Alice Edwards).
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Convention-into domestically enforceable federal law'62 that
honors the United States' "tradition of welcoming the oppressed
of other nations" and is consistent with the United States'
obligations under international law.' 63 Furthermore, it is well-
established that federal statutes, like the Refugee Act, must, to
the furthest extent possible, be construed in a manner consistent
with the United States' international obligations, such as those
stemming from the Convention. 164  This legal instrument
commits its signatories to cooperate with the UNHCR, which is
tasked with coordinating and supervising compliance with the
Convention. 65 In light of the above, U.S. circuit courts should
adopt the UNHCR's approach to defining membership of a
particular social group under the Refugee Act.
This method of using the United States' international
obligations to decipher domestic obligations under implementing
legislation is not without precedent. In Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc.,66 the Supreme Court did just that.'67 The Court
grappled with whether the relevant provision of the Refugee Act
applied extraterritorially on the high seas and thus precluded the
Attorney General from repatriating Haitians coming to the
United States by boat without first assessing whether they fell
within the category of refugee under the Refugee Act. 168 After
looking to the Convention's text and the delegates' statements
during negotiations, the Court held that it was not intended to
apply extraterritorially.169  Construing the Refugee Act in a
manner consistent with the Convention, the Court held that it
too must not apply extraterritorially. 70 Sale provides authority
for U.S. courts to look to our nation's international obligations in
defining membership in a particular social group pursuant to the
Refugee Act.
162 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
163 H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 17-18 (1979).
164 Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804) ("[An act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains .... ).
165 U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, supra note 9.
166 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
167 Id. at 177-80, 182-83, 187-88.
16 Id. at 158.
169 Id. at 184-85, 187-88.
170 Id. at 187-88.
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A. A Demonstration: The United Kingdom's House of Lords
The highest court in the United Kingdom' 7 ' relies heavily on
the UNHCR's Guidelines to assess whether an individual
qualifies as a member of a particular social group, and in doing
so has dismissed inappropriately rigorous standards for proving
same. 172
In the consolidated cases Fornah v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department and K v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, the House of Lords grappled with provisions of the
European Union Council Directive 2004/83/EC that were
interpreted by the respondents to impose a dual-requirement
framework that was inconsistent with the Guidelines.'73 The
Directive provides in relevant part that:
Member states shall take the following elements into account
when assessing the reasons for persecution:
(d) a group shall be considered to form a particular social group
where in particular:
[(i)] members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a
common background that cannot be changed, or share a
characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or
conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, and
[(ii)] that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country,
because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding
society.... 174
171 At the time of the cases discussed in this Section, the "House of Lords" was
the name of the highest court. In 2009, however, the court was renamed the United
Kingdom Supreme Court.
172 The Supreme Court's opinion in Abbott v. Abbott illustrates why it is
appropriate for United States courts to interpret the nation's obligations under the
implementing legislation of an international treaty in light of how other contracting
parties apply that treaty. 560 U.S. 1 (2010). In Abbott, the Supreme Court was
tasked with deciphering provisions of Congress's International Child Abduction
Remedies Act, which implemented legislation for the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, to which the United States is a
contracting party. Id. at 5. The Court looked to the approaches of the English High
Court of Justice, the Supreme Court of Israel, the Canadian Supreme court, as well
as other foreign courts. Id. at 16-17.
173 K v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2006] UKHL 46, [2007] 1 A.C. 412,
426, 432-33 (appeal taken from Eng.).
174 Council Directive 2004/83, art. 10(1)(d), 2004 O.J. (L 304) 12, 17 (EC),
available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4157e75e4.pdf.
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The court asserted that if the Council Directive was
interpreted to require both immutability, as set out in (i), and
social cognizability, as set out in (ii), the Directive would be
inconsistent with the Convention and Protocol, 175 to which the
United Kingdom acceded in 1954 and 1968, respectively. 176 If,
however, the provision is interpreted literally to mean a group
exists when (i) and (ii) are found to exist, then the provision is
not inconsistent with the Convention and Protocol. 7 7 The court
adopted the literal interpretation on the ground that adopting
the respondents' interpretation would result in the application of
a standard that was far too stringent than that of the
Convention, Protocol, and Guidelines.75 The practical difficulty
of applying such a standard is illustrated below.
IV. A CASE STUDY OF THE HEI HAIZI AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF
REQUIRING "SOCIAL VISIBILITY"
The group of children born in violation of China's one-child
policy provides a striking example of the difficulties of applying
social visibility as a prerequisite to qualifying for refugee status
on account of persecution based on membership in a particular
social group. These individuals are referred to as the hei haizi,
and they lack any externally distinguishable characteristic,
whether it be physical, linguistic, or behavioral, that would put
116 K, [2007] 1 A.C. at 431-33.
176 See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 8,
ch. V.2, V.5.
177 K, [2007] 1 A.C. at 432.
178 Id. at 432-33. Furthermore, the House of Lords has rejected attempts at
engrafting additional requirements onto the Guidelines' disjunctive approach. In
Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the asylum-seekers, married
Pakistani women, were at risk of being falsely accused of committing adultery.
[1999] 2 A.C. (H.L.) 629, 629 (appeal taken from Eng.). One of the justices of the
Court of Appeal held that the women did not qualify for asylum on the ground that
they lacked a sufficient degree of "cohesiveness, co-operation or interdependence."
Id. at 638 (quoting Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [1998] 1 W.L.R. 74
(C.A.) [93d] (Eng.)). Relying on Acosta and the Guidelines, the House of Lords
rejected cohesiveness as a requirement on the ground that making it indispensible
would be too restrictive and would be contrary to the principle of ejusdem generis. Id.
at 643. The court used the case of homosexuals to demonstrate how a "cohesiveness"
requirement would preclude an otherwise eligible group from qualifying for asylum.
Id. Homosexuals do not make up a cohesive group; denying them asylum on this
ground would constitute a grave injustice and contravene the purpose of the
Convention, which is to extend refugee status to individuals who are persecuted
based on, amongst other things, characteristics that are immutable and unalterable.
Id.
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their status as a member of the hei haizi in public view. 179 To
deny the persecuted hei haizi asylum on the ground that they
lack the requisite social visibility would constitute a grave
injustice.
A. A Brief History
In an attempt to stymie the growth of its population, the
People's Republic of China implemented a one child policy in
1979 that limits the number of children a couple can have to one.
Exceptions to the rule vary amongst provinces but examples
include couples in rural areas,'80 and couples in which both
parents are only children.'' Couples who have children in excess
of the quota are often subjected to forced sterilization and
abortion, as well as exorbitant fines.182  The hei haizi are
ostracized and precluded from health care and higher
education, 8 3 and cannot be listed on the family's hukou, a
mandatory national record of household registration.8 4 Failure
to be included in a hukou excludes the child from the family's
food ration.8 5 In extreme cases, "[t]he hei haizi are also excluded
from many jobs, may not acquire property, and in some cases are
denied the right to marry and have children. 18 6
B. Hei Haizi as a "Particular Social Group"
Many U.S. courts have assessed the asylum claims of hei
haizi on the basis of imputed political opinion.8 7 Pursuant to
this approach, the child must prove that the child is persecuted
or has a well-founded fear of persecution because the oppressor is
179 Brian Edstrom, Assessing Asylum Claims from Children Born in Violation of
China's One-Child Policy: What the United States Can Learn from Australia, 27 WIs.
INT'L L.J. 139, 149 (2009).
180 Id. at 142.
181 Cong.-Exec. Comm'n on China, Population Planning 1, http://www.cecc.gov/
sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/documents/AR14Population%20Planning-final
.pdf. Please be advised that since the drafting of this Note, China's committee of the
National People's Congress amended the Policy. Today, couples in which only one
parent is an only child are permitted to have a second child. Id.
182 Edstrom, supra note 179, at 142-43.
183 Id. at 144.
184 Id.
185 Id.
18 Chen v. Holder, 604 F.3d 324, 328 (7th Cir. 2010).
187 See id.; Jiang v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 137, 139-40 (2d Cir. 2007); Zhang v.
Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir. 2005).
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imputing the political opinion of the child's parents, who violated
the policy, to the child.' However, critics of the "imputed
political opinion approach" in this context refuse to apply it on
the ground that it would result in too many undeserving grants
of refugee status. Judge Sneed, for example, from the Ninth
Circuit articulated, "We distort the meaning of an important
requirement for refugee status when we permit political
aloofness to serve as an active 'political opinion,' that endangers
its holder. It also demeans the true martyr for whom asylum
was intended."" 9 Courts need to disconnect the asylum claims of
children born in violation of the policy from the claims of their
parents, and stop limiting themselves to the theory of imputed
political opinion.190 Instead, courts must ground these asylum
claims on the basis of persecution on account of membership in a
particular social group, the hei haizi.
Defining the hei haizi as a particular social group has
support in Australian jurisprudence. In Chen Shi Hai v.
Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs,191 the
Australian High Court did not contemplate the theory of imputed
political opinion. Instead, it found that children born in violation
of China's one-child policy are members of a particular social
group. 192
Even if courts were to adopt Australia's approach to
assessing these asylum claims, the hei haizi would confront a
serious obstacle, the requirement that they themselves be
socially visible. Under the more restrictive approach of the
majority of the circuit courts in the United States, minors born in
violation of the policy would not qualify because, individually,
they exhibit no externally distinguishable characteristic that
"I" Donald W. Yoo, Exploring the Doctrine of Imputed Political Opinion and Its
Application in the Ninth Circuit, 19 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 391, 396 (2005).
189 Mendoza Perez v. U.S. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1990) (Sneed, J.,
concurring); see also Yoo, supra note 188, at 397-98.
190 In Chen v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit based Chen's asylum claim on two
alternative theories: persecution on account of political opinion, and persecution on
account of membership in a particular social group. 604 F.3d at 330. The court
articulated that Chen is not per se eligible for asylum because his mother was
forcibly sterilized. Id. at 332. However, Chen could prevail on the theory of imputed
political opinion. Id. The court noted that the BIA was dismissive of recognizing the
existence of a particular social group comprised of hei haizi. Id. at 333.
191 Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (2000) 201
C.L.R. 293 (Austl.).
192 Id. at 304-06.
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puts the persecutor on notice of their membership in the
particular social group. 193 In addition to lacking any physical,
linguistic, or behavioral characteristics that highlight their
membership in the hei haizi to the public, efforts of parents to
conceal these children in an attempt to evade fines, sterilization,
or other forms of punishment further entrench the hei haizi's
invisibility. Under the approach of the minority of circuits, the
hei haizi would satisfy the immutability test because they exhibit
an unalterable trait. Pursuant to the Guidelines' approach, these
minors would qualify pursuant to either the protected
characteristics approach or the social perception approach.
Under the protected characteristics approach, the asylum-
seeker must demonstrate that the asylum-seeker shares an
immutable characteristic with other members of the purported
group. 194  "An immutable characteristic may be innate... or
unalterable for other reasons." 95 Members of the hei haizi are
united by the circumstance of their birth in violation of China's
one-child policy, a characteristic that is both immutable and
unalterable, absent eradication of the policy. Furthermore,
pursuant to the social perception approach, children born in
violation of the policy are cognizable, or recognized as a group
that is distinct from society, 9 6 as evidenced by their exclusion
from, for example, government-funded health care and higher
education.
CONCLUSION
In determining whether an alien qualifies as a member of a
particular social group U.S. courts should adopt the UNHCR's
approach. The UNHCR is the leading authority in refugee status
determination and is responsible for coordinating and
supervising application of the Convention and Protocol.'97
Therefore, its Guidelines, which clearly explain what an
193 Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991) ("A particular social group is
comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common
which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor-or in the eyes of the
outside world in general." (emphasis added)).
194 Guidelines, supra note 10, T 6.
195 Id.
196 Id. 7 ("The second approach [the 'social perception' approach] examines
whether or not a group shares a common characteristic which makes them a
cognizable group or sets them apart from society at large.").
197 See Convention, supra note 4, pmbl., para. 6.
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applicant must demonstrate to qualify as a member of a
particular social group, should be used to decipher the United
States' obligations under the Refugee Act, which converts the
Convention and Protocol into domestically enforceable federal
law. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the U.S.
government frequently requests the guidance and expertise of
the UNHCR in developing domestic refugee law. U.S. courts
should require a showing of immutability or cognizability,
consistent with the Guidelines.9 ' Requiring immutability, social
visibility, and particularity is arbitrary and impractical. This
approach is overly restrictive and deviates from international law
to which the U.S. is bound. In practice, the approach precludes
deserving aliens in flight of persecution who lack any externally
distinguishable feature and are often concealed from society,199
like members of the hei haizi, from qualifying for refugee status
in the United States.
198 See generally Guidelines, supra note 10.
19 See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
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